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DANCING AROUND THE ISSUE OF FIFRA PREEMPTION:
DOES IT REALLY STILL MATTER THAT THE SUPREME
COURT HAS NOT MADE A DECISION?
SANDRA L. FEELEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most farmers spray pesticides on their yearly crops. Whether
or not they read the warning label, follow the instructions, and avoid
overexposure caused by prolonged inhalation of the pesticide, the
pesticide may still harm them.' Manufacturers are compelled to comply
with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act2 (FIFRA)
and its regulations, requiring the pesticide and its label to be approved
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). However, their
products may continue to cause detrimental health conditions for users.
When this happens, sympathy for harmed plaintiffs increases because
of the pesticide's failure to warn of the specific health problem
acquired. Most people are more likely to sympathize with the innocent
farmer, rather than the manufacturer who sent a harmful product into
the market without an adequate warning.
However, this overlooks the fact that harm caused by the
product equally surprised the defendant-manufacturer. After all, the
manufacturer does not feel that they are at fault, since they went
through the required steps for EPA approval of the label under FIFRA.
FIFRA sets out the guidelines for an adequate pesticide label. The
manufacturers follow the guidelines, relying on FIFRA to shield itself
from liability under a state failure to warn cause of action. The
manufacturer feels that it has complied through its actions by listing the
risks of the pesticide known to it at the time.
Warnings are defective for many reasons, some of which may
include the following: the warning is badly written; the manufacturer or
the EPA consciously decides not to worry about a known risk; the risk
is unknown at the time; or the manufacturer may not inform the EPA
about a risk known at the time.3 Most litigation over warnings concern
*Senior Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law; J.D. 2000
University of Kentucky.
'See, Scott D. Deatherage, Scientific Uncertainty in Regulating Deliberate Release of
Genetically Engineered Organisms: Substantive Judicial Review and Institutional Alternatives, I I
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203 (1987) (the environmental release of genetically engineered pesticides
may cause new and untreatable diseases, seriously alter the balance of nature, or develop new
strains of super pests).
27 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
3See Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users:
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the proposition that the warning given was unclear or omitted a known
risk, as opposed to omission of a risk unknown at the time or decidedly
not worth worrying about.'
An adequate warning requires reasonableness under the
circumstances.' The warning must have adequate factual content,
which provides information about all significant risks of product use
and the likelihood and gravity of such risks known to the manufacturer.
In addition, the physical format of the warning must be noticeable to
the user and phrased to import danger without being ambiguous,
equivocal, or contradictory.' The general public must easily understand
the warning.' Finally, a warning may still be inadequate even by
satisfying these requirements if it has not been communicated through
the most effective channels.'
Even with these guidelines, pesticide users and manufacturers
face confusion concerning warnings when plaintiffs seek damages for
injuries caused by pesticides. FIFRA makes it clear that it preempts
any state statutory enactments that purport to regulate pesticide labeling
and packaging."0 Yet, confusion exists about whether FIFRA preempts
state common law failure to warn claims that essentially regulate
pesticide labels and packages.
When courts consider failure to warn claims, they have no
Supreme Court precedent to turn to for an answer. While the Supreme
Court has decided preemption cases, it has not addressed preemption,
with respect to pesticides. To date, the two most relevant decisions on
this issue by the Court came to opposite conclusions: Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc. " held in favor of federal preemption of common
law failure to warn claims while Medtronic v. Lohr"2 held against
preemption. Most lower courts have followed the lead of Cipollone,
holding in favor of FIFRA preemption.' 3 However, confusion plagues
Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L.







sAusness, supra note 3, at 1193,
9
1d. at 1t94.
7oU.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. I 1990).
11505 U.S. 504 (1992).
12116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
' 3See, e.g., Levesque v. Miles, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 61 (D. N.H. 1993); Casperv. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Wa. 1992); Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d
364 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding FIFRA preempts state failure to warn claims based on negligence or
strict liability); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding FIFRA's preemptive provision is different from the 1969 Act in Cipollone but
their effect is the same); Papas v. Upjohn, 985 F.2d 516 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding the word
"requirements" in Section 136v(b) of FIFRA preempts state law negligence, strict liability, and
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the courts over the effect of the recent Medtronic decision.
This note concludes that FIFRA does preempt these common
law claims because FIFRA follows the statute at issue in Cipollone
more than the statute at issue Medtronic. Therefore, until the Supreme
Court decides preemption in the specific context of pesticides, courts
should follow a Cipollone analysis in deciding FIFRA preemption
cases. In addition, even without comparisons to the statutes involved in
Supreme Court decisions, the language of FIFRA and the
Congressional intent in its enactment show that the FIFRA statute
clearly preempts common law failure to warn claims. 4
II. THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
developed over several decades. Its purpose changed as the concerns
for individual users of pesticides tumed into concerns for the
environment. Through various revisions and amendments, FIFRA
transformed from a simple labeling law for pesticides into a statute with
complex regulations. 5
A. The Creation and Purpose of FIFRA
Congress enacted FIFRA in 1947, replacing the Insecticide Act
of 19 10,16 the primary purpose of which was to protect purchasers of
insecticides from deception."' In the 1940s, the number of insecticides
implied warranty claims premised on a failure to warn).
4
See, e.g., Caroline E. Boeh, Note, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: One Step Closer
to Exterminating the FIFRA Preemption Controversy, 81 KY. L. J- 749,777 (1993) (concluding
Congress expressly preempts all state tort law damage claims based on failure to warn, based on
the explicit language of section 136v(b)); S. Douglas Fish, Note, In Defense qfFIFRA Preemption
of Failure to Warn Claims, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 123, 140 (1997) (concluding
preemption is by necessity, for the sake of Congressional intent of uniformity). But see Brian M.
Brown, Note, Federal Preemption ofState Tort Law Failure to Warn Claims by FIFRA: Injury
Without Relief?., 4 S.C. ENVTL. L. J. 147, 163-64 (1995) (conceding that a goal of FIFRA is
uniformity but distinguishes the 1969 Act in Cipollone from FIFRA in the approach each takes to
achieve uniformity); R, David AlInut, Comment, FIFRA Preemption of State Common Law
Claims after Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 68 WASH. L. REV. 859, 880 (1993) (concluding
that FIFRA's language and legislative history do not indicate Congressional intent to foreclose
common law remedies).
"5See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2655 (1988); Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act
Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-237, 105 Stat. 1818 (1991); Food Quality Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
'6The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331, repealed by Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, § 16, 61 Stat. 172 (1947).
"William T. Smith, III & Kathryn M. Coonrod. Cipollone's Effect on FIFRA
Preemption, 61 UMKC L. REV. 489, 490 (1991).
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and herbicides produced progressively increased," sparking numerous
complicated, non-uniform state statutes and regulations." FIFRA
purported to give the Department of Agriculture authority over the
pesticide registration process and regulation of the labels."° The
purpose behind this was to make it more centralized and uniform."
FIFRA required registration of all pesticides to establish this desired
uniformity."
In the 1970s, concern increased over the effect of pesticides on
the environment.23 Because FIFRA focused on safety of immediate
pesticide users, the regulation was not effective in protecting the
environment from the consequences of pesticide use. This concern led
to substantial amendments to FIFRA in 1972 and the creation of the
EPA, which assumed authority from the Department of Agriculture for
administering and enforcing FIFRA. 5 In addition, further amendments
to FIFRA took place in 198826, 1991,27 and 1996," but these were less
important to the overall impact of FIFRA.
After the extensive revisions in 1972, FIFRA was no longer
considered a labeling law.29 Instead, FIFRA was transformed "into a
comprehensive regulatory statute."30 The EPA assumed authority to
determine whether, and under what circumstances, a pesticide could be
registered for manufacture and sale in the United States.3' The
"'See H.R. Rep. No- 80-313, at 1200 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1200;
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, §§ 2-13,61 Stat. 163-172
(1947).
"'See H.R. Rep. No. 80-313, at 1205 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1200,
1205-06; see also S. Rep. No. 92-838, at 3993, 3999 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3993, 3999; H.R. Rep. No. 80-313, supra note 13, at 1205-1206.




2See H.R. Rep. No. 80-313 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1200; Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, §§ 2-13, 61 Stat. 163-172- (emphasis added).
24See H.R. Rep. No. 80-313 (1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1200; Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, ch. 125, §§ 2-13,61 Stat. 163-172.; S- Rep.
No. 88-573 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166.
25Valle S. Dutcher, The Marlboro Man Meets the Orkin Man: The Effect ofCipollone-
v. Liggett Group, Inc. on Federal Preemption by the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and
Radenticide Act of Failure to Warn Claims Brought Under State Tort Law, 15 J. PRODUCTS &
Toxics LIABILITY 29, 35 (1993).26Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-532, 102 Stat. 2655.
27Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-237, 105 Stat. 1818.28Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.
29Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601 (1991) (quoting
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984)).311d. at 598-99.
3 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991. Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136a(a) (1994) (providing that no pesticide
may be sold in the United States unless it is registered with the EPA).
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requirements for registering a pesticide include: its composition
warrants the proposed claims for it; its labeling and other material
required for submittal to the EPA comply with FIFRA; its use will not
have unreasonable adverse effects on the environment; and when used
in a recognized fashion, it will not generally cause unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment.32 In carrying out the goals of this
statute, the EPA performs a cost-benefit analysis on each product to
determine if, overall, the product represents "an unreasonable risk to
man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social and
environmental costs and benefits of the use of [the] pesticide."33
B. Warning Label Requirements of FIFRA
The EPA's labeling guidelines are extremely thorough in
controlling the composition of a pesticide's label. These labeling
provisions intend the product's warning label to reflect restrictions of
the cost-benefit analysis' and prevent "unreasonable burdens [on]
commerce," which would result if manufacturers had to create different
forms of the same pesticide under varying state regulations. 5 Because
the EPA decides whether a pesticide manufacturer has satisfied its duty
of care in the product's safety and its duty to warn in the product's
label, EPA approval represents a finding of due care on the
manufacturer's part.
FIFRA demands that all pesticides be packaged with a warning
label that indicates the EPA's approval. 6 The warning label must also
provide information on the name, brand, or trademark of the product;37
the name and address of the producer or registrant;38 the product's
contents;39 a comprehensive ingredient statement containing the name
and percentage weight of each of the product's active ingredients and
the total percentage weight of all its inactive ingredients;4 ° a warning of
general toxicological hazards;4' a statement of what to do in case of
hazardous exposure;43 directions for use, with limitations and
327 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1994).
337 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (1994).
34See S. Rep. No. 92-838, at 91-92 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993,
4032.
" S. Rep. No. 92-970, at 12 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092,4111-4112;
see also 40 C.F.R. § 156. 10(h)(1) (1995).
367 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(1), (5) (1991).





4'Id. § 156.10(g).411d. § 156.10(h).
4240 C.F.R. § 156.10(h)(iii)(A) (1998).
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restrictions to prevent unreasonable effects;43 statement of use
classifications (i.e. general use, restricted use);" and the nature of any
restrictions."
III. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of federal preemption comes from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.46 The Supremacy Clause
provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." '47 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted this clause to render any conflicting state law "without
effect" and therefore preempted by federal law.4 Moreover, the most
important consideration under this basic theory of federal preemption is
Congress' intent in enacting the law.49
A. Consequences of Preemption
Although federal preemption provides consistency, clarity and
uniformity, broad use of authority to preempt state tort law has a
number of negative consequences on state interests and the interests of
injured parties."0 First, the protection of public health and safety are
traditionally matters of state interest." Thus, serious federalism
concerns arise when federal preemption infringes on a state's power to
protect its own citizens. 2
Another concern involves insulation of manufacturers against
tort liability when federal safety standards prove to be inadequate or
obsolete. 3 Additionally, the influence of politics and industry often




46U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
4 7
/d.
4 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (I Wheat) 316 (1819) (holding that, due to the
Supremacy Clause, any state law that conflicts with federal law is preempted by federal law).
'4Wisconsin Pub. intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991).
"4Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55
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providing an incentive for manufacturers to exceed federal
requirements when proven to be cost-effective."5 Federal preemption
would foreclose this incentive to exceed minimal standards because the
manufacturer could escape tort liability by meeting the inadequate
federal standards.56
Finally, preemption leaves injured parties without the
protection of state law remedies by relieving the manufacturer of any
duty to compensate victims. 7 Tort liability shifts the costs of accidents
from individuals to manufacturers. The manufacturers can spread
liability costs to consumers through the pricing mechanism,58 further
shifting the costs of accidents to the general public. 9 This promotes
social welfare by reducing "secondary" accident costs.' However,
federal preemption precludes these loss-spreading benefits that
individuals could derive from utilizing state law remedies.
B. Requirements for Preemption
Particularly in certain subject areas, constant disagreement
exists between the states and the federal government to determine who
will ultimately regulate the same matter. Most federal preemption
litigation involving FIFRA has focused on two primary issues: (1) the
labeling and packaging requirements delegated to the EPA, and (2)
section 136v(b) of FIFRA.6' In the typical tort case, plaintiffs claim
that a pesticide injured them or damaged their land, that the EPA
approved an inadequate label or package, that the inadequacy caused
their injuries, and that they should get relief from state tort law under a
failure to warn claim.62 In response, manufacturers argue that the
federal government controls this field because it has preempted state




Ausness, supra note 50, at 1238.
57
1d.
"Id.; See also W. Page Keeton, Products Liability--Liability without Fault and the
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 856 (1963).
5'W. Page Keeton, Products Liabilitv-Liabilit without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REv. 855,856 (1963).
6
uAusness,supra note 50, at 1238.; See also Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517-18 (1961) (stating that losses are least
harmful ifbroadly spread).
617 U.S.C. § 136v(a)-(b) (1988).
62
See Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177
(10th Cir. 1993); Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Upjohn
Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (1l th Cir. 1991).
6 3
papas, 926 F.2d at 1020-21; Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1532
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.1062 (1984).
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state law must be "clear and manifest." The Supreme Court feels
reluctant to find preemption when state common-law doctrines
encompass years of judicial development and concern in traditional
areas of state interest." The Court particularly hesitates to find
preemption if it threatens the state's ability to exercise its police power
to protect the health and safety of its citizens' or apply its common
law.
67
Federal court decisions on FIFRA preemption of state tort law
damage claims have held that either FIFRA either expressly or
impliedly preempts state law,68 or it does not. 9 Preemption occurs in
several ways, including when Congress declares its intent to preempt by
express language; when a federal regulatory scheme occupies the field,
leaving no room for state regulation; and when state law conflicts with
federal regulatory objectives.7'
1. Express Preemption
In express preemption, the court looks to the statutory language
to determine if the plain language specifically preempts an area of
law.7 The Supreme Court will invalidate any state regulation that
Congress has expressed intent to preempt through explicit statutory
language.72  Express preemption occurs when a federal statute
specifically excludes a state regulation in a particular area or by a
federal agency's regulations when the agency is acting within the scope
of its authority.73
'4Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.CAR. L. REv. 187, 191-92 (1993).65
1d. at 192.
'See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,442-43 (1960)
(upholding local pollution controls); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 84-85
(1939) (upholding state truck safety requirements).
67See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542 (noting that state common law claims are within "the
scope of state superintendence"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (courts must not lightly infer conflict between a federal
regulation and a state compensatory damage action because the two pursue different goals).
6'See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128, 1136 (E.D. N.Y. 1992); Youngv.
American Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781,782 (E.D. Ark. 1991); Herr v- Carolina Log Bldgs.,
Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 961 (S.D.Ind. 1989); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804
(M.D. Fla. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283, 1286 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404,406 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
'See Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F.Supp. 928,932 (S.D. Tex. 1992);
Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1503 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F.
Supp. 85,87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
7 Ausness, supra note 64, at 192-93.
"Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516 (1992).
7
2
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U S. 519, 530-32 (1977).
73 Ausness, supra note 64, at 192-93.
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2. Implied Preemption
On the other hand, implied preemption arises when a statute is
so thorough that Congress clearly intended to occupy that field.
74 In
these situations, the Court has held states powerless to regulate fields
where federal law is so pervasive that Congress has left no room for the
states to act." This may arise from a dominant federal interest
justifying federal occupation of a field or from a pervasive federal
regulation excluding even supplementary or parallel state regulations.1
6
Implied preemption also arises where state law directly
conflicts with federal law.' Even absent express intent, federal law will
preempt state regulations that "conflict in fact" with a federal scheme.
8
Several ways a conflict may occur include when state law requires
action that federal law forbids, making it impossible to comply with
both; when state law impairs the exercise of federally created rights;
and when state law frustrates federal regulatory goals by hindering the
conduct that Congress is trying to encourage or promoting the same
conduct Congress is trying to discourage. 9
While the Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of federal
preemption of pesticide use," it has not addressed the issue of federal
preemption of state regulation of failure to warn claims concerning
pesticide labeling and packaging.8
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF CASELAW AFFECTING FIFRA PREEMPTION
Section 136v of FIFRA is the most important provision in any
discussion of FIFRA. Section 136v(a) grants the states power to
"regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device
in the State," with the exception that states cannot regulate such sale or
use in contradiction of FIFRA 2 This subsection is known as the
"savings provision" of FIFRA because it explicitly reserves at least
"
4
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516(1992); See also 7 U.S.C. § 136v
(1988); text at nn. I I & 12.
"See, e.g., Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525,535 (1959);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,236 (1947).
'
6Ausness, supra note 64, at 194-95.
71Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); see also 7 U.S.C. § 136v
nn. II & 12 (1988).
"See, e.g.. Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S.I, 3 (1986); Fidelity Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Dc la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
"Ausness, supra note 65, at 196-97.
''See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 615-16 (1991).
"'Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d941,948 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 80 (1992).
627 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
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some power for the states. 3
However, Congress evidences its desire for uniform regulation
of pesticides in the context of labeling in FIFRA where it grants the
EPA exclusive authority to regulate the content of pesticide warning
labels. Thus, section 136v(b) provides: "Such State shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in
addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." 4
Clearly, Congress has disallowed direct state regulation of labeling or
packaging on pesticides. Yet, the question remains about the possible
preemptive effect of FIFRA on state common law tort actions for
failure to warn.
A. Caselaw Prior to Cipollone
Prior to the important 1992 decision of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., " the courts were divided as to whether FIFRA preempted
state tort law failure to warn claims based on inadequate labeling or
packaging. The first case to address the question of whether FIFRA
preempted such a claim was Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 6 In that
case, the court found FIFRA served a regulatory function, while state
common law tort actions served the different function of compensating
individuals for injuries."7 This was critical because the court essentially
stated that compensation for injuries under state law was not included
in the same category as regulations.8"
Therefore, FIFRA preemption did not cover state common law
failure to warn claims because FIFRA and state common law belonged
in two separate categories with no overlap. State tort claims neither
make compliance with FIFRA impossible nor prevent accomplishment
of FIFRA's defenses.89 The Court found no express or implied
preemption in section 136v(b) of FIFRA.9" This decision has become
the leading case for the proposition that FIFRA does not preempt state
tort law claims, even though the pesticide's label complies with
FIFRA's labeling requirements."
However, other court decisions addressing FIFRA preemption
3Burkev. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
s'7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
11505 U.S. 504 (1992).





91See also Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339,
1344 (D. Mont. 1991); Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1507-08 (W.D. Mo. 1991);
Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
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reached different conclusions. The court in Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.9 2 agreed with the reasoning
in Papas v. Upjohn Co.," which had found implied preemption where
jury awards of damages in failure to warn actions would directly
conflict with federal law.9 According to the Arkansas-Platte court,
"[w]hile FIFRA explicitly instructs [that] states can regulate the sale or
use of federally registered pesticides, § 136v(b) precludes 'any
requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required pursuant to this act.' The Papas court reasoned jury
awards of damages in these actions would result in direct conflict with
federal law. We agree."
The Arkansas-Platte court also relied on the Supreme Court
decision in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier96 to make the
distinction between the regulation ofpesticide use and the regulation of
pesticide labeling and packaging.97 Although the Supreme Court in
Mortier said that local use regulations were not preempted, it suggested
that FIFRA preempted regulation ofpesticide labeling.9" The Arkansas-
Platte court concluded that, while Congress had not occupied the broad
field of pesticide regulation, it had occupied the narrower field of
pesticide labeling and packaging." The court explained that "[s]tate
court damage awards based on failure to warn would constitute ad hoc
determinations of the adequacy of statutory labeling standards [by
individual state juries]. This would hinder the accomplishment of the
full purpose of § 136v(b), which is to ensure uniform labeling
standards."'"
While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
issue of federal preemption of labeling and packaging faced in Ferebee
and Arkansas-Platte, certain statements made by the Court in Mortier
indicate it might find preemption in the field of pesticide labeling if it
were to decide the issue. The Supreme Court stated that the language
of section 136v(b) would be surplusage if Congress had intended to
occupy the entire field of regulating pesticides.'' This proposition
supports the claim that labeling regulation does not fall under sale or
92
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 161
(10th Cir.) (1991).
93926 F.2d 10 19 (1lth Cir. 1991).
141d. at 1024.
"Arkansas-Platte & GulfP'ship, 959 F.2d at 161 (quoting Papas, 926 F.2d at 1024).
96501 U.S. 597 (1991).
9 Arkansas-Platte & GulfPartnership, 959 F.2d 158 (1 0th Cir. 1993).
9'Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613, 615 (1991).
9Arkansas-Platte & GulfP'ship, 959 F.2d at 160.
(ild. at 162.
""Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,991
(1984)).
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use regulation of section 136v(a). The Court also noted that local use
regulations, unlike labeling, do not fall within an area that FIFRA
preempts.' 2 This implies that FIFRA does preempt labeling, so that
states may not regulate this area. 3 Yet, even with this existing dicta
for courts to consider, the issue is still unresolved. The Supreme Court
or Congress must directly address it eventually.
B. The Supreme Court Decides Preemption: Cipollone
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc. °" Although the issue in the case was federal
preemption of state tort law damage actions in the context of cigarette
labeling,"5 the decision had a pronounced impact on FIFRA labeling
and packaging litigation. Where courts had previously been split as to
whether FIFRA preempted state common law failure to warn actions,
the majority of post-Cipollone decisions hold that FIFRA does preempt
such actions."0
The petitioner, the son of Rose Cipollone, alleged that
respondents were responsible for his mother's lung cancer and ultimate
death from the cigarettes produced by respondents.0 7 His claims
consisted of failure to warn,"' design defect, breach of express
warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud.'°
Petitioner challenged the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 19651. and its successor, the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969."' The respondents contended
that the above Acts preempted all state tort law damage claims "based
on conduct after 1965 '"I2 and that Rose Cipollone began smoking
cigarettes prior to the enactment of either provision."3
The Court determined that when Congress specifically
addresses federal preemption in a statute, as the 1965 and 1969 Acts did
with § 1334, courts are prohibited from applying an implied preemption
analysis and can "only identify the domain expressly [preempted] by"
21d. at 615.
""'SeeArkansas-Platte v. GufP "ship, 959 F.2d at 163; Young v. American Cyanamid
Co., 786 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
'04505 U.S. 504 (1992).
1051d.
"'0William T. Smith, III & Kathryn M. Coonrod, Cipollone's Effect on FIFRA
Preemption, 61 UMKC L. REV. 489, 502 (1991).
"'1Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
'Iid. at 508.
10id. at 508-09.
"0Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1965).
"'Cipollone, 504 U.S. 504; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1969).
"' 2Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 510.
M3 id. at 508.
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the statute section in question." 4 Therefore, courts can only determine
the extent to which Congress intended to expressly preempt by the
section in question, but cannot perform an implied preemption analysis
on the statute at all." 5 Because of this presumption against preemption
and because no conflict existed between federal preemption of state
warning requirements and continued allowance of state common law
actions for damages," I6 the Court held there was no preemption of state
common law damages." 7 The Court stated that the requirement of a
specific warning label does not automatically preempt an entire field"'
and the term "regulations" in the purpose statement of the 1965 Act
only referred to positive enactments of law and not state common law
damages. ' "
As to the 1969 Act, 20 the Cipollone court reached a different
conclusion.' The Court looked principally to changes in the language
of the 1969 provision as indicating Congressional intent to broaden the
scope of preemption from the 1965 Act. 22 The plurality said that the
phrase "requirement or prohibition" encompassed both positive
enactments and common law damages, 3 and furthermore that the
phrase "imposed under State law" included statutes, regulations and
common law rules. 24
C. The Further Effects of Medtronic on FIFRA Litigation
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided Medironic v. Lohr,
25
a case that could strongly impact FIFRA litigation. Medtronic involved
design defect and failure to warn claims for a defective pacemaker part
regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)
26
The Supreme Court held that the MDA did not preempt the design
defect claim. More importantly, the Court split 5-4 against preemption




"'Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31.
"Id. at 518.
"91d. at 519.
121115 u.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969).
'21Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 519.
"'Id. at 520-21.
"'23 . at 521.
124 Id. at 521. (citingNorfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117 (1991)).
125116 S.Ct. 2240 (1996).
126The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 (1976); see also
Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470,475.
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process of reviewing the requirements medical devices must meet
before entering the market.'27 Because the review process contained
reviewing exceptions for devices on the market prior to the MDA and
for products "substantially equivalent" to devices already being sold on
the market, not all medical devices went through the extensive MDA
review.' The pacemaker device in this situation fell within these
exceptions.'29 To decide the case, the Court emphasized that states are
sovereign entities, so Congress would not "cavalierly" preempt state
common law.'30 Therefore, the Court must look to Congress' purpose
of the statute to determine its meaning.'3'
The Court stated that Congress could not have intended the
MDA to preempt all common law actions because then state courts
could not protect medical device users from injuries.' In looking at
the language of the statute, the plurality found the word "requirement"
to be an "odd word" to use if Congress intended total preemption. 3
The Court distinguished the Cipollone decision because MDA
preemption would have a greater impact on state sovereignty and
plaintiffs' ability to obtain redress if allowed.'""
The concurring opinion in Medtronic recognized the FDA's
regulation that the state requirement must be "different from, or in
addition to, the specific requirements" of the MDA. ' 5 Since the
common law failure to warn claim did not specifically conflict with the
MDA regulations, there was no preemption.'36 The dissenting opinion's
stand regarding the failure to warn claim disagreed with the plurality's
analysis of the word "requirement," instead the dissenters focused on
the Supreme Court's rationale in Cipollone as relevant and controlling
precedent. 1
37
This most recent decision on preemption found that the MDA
statute does not preempt state law on failure to warn claims. However,
this does not affect the trend of finding FIFRA preemption of these
types of claims because the Medtronic decision does not apply to
FIFRA. It initially appears that the dissenting opinion does the best job
focusing on the rationale behind Cipollone and applying it to the
situation in Medtronic. However, even conceding the plurality's
'
27
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distinction of Cipollone and Medtronic, FIFRA can still stand on its
own. The differences between FIFRA and the MDA leave ample room
for the Supreme Court to decide that FIFRA preempts state common
law failure to warn claims.
In fact, Lewis v. American Cyanamid Co.3" discussed the effect
of the Medtronic decision on FIFRA and found that FIFRA still
preempted state common law claims.'39 In this case, the plaintiff was
injured when a flame from the pilot light of a gas oven or a spark from
a refrigerator motor ignited an insecticide can. 4 ' The court stated that
"since FIFRA would preempt a state statute or regulation which
imposes a monetary penalty on a manufacturer for not using a pesticide
label different from that approved by the EPA, FIFRA also preempts a
common law rule that would subject a manufacturer to a damage
judgment for the same adherence to federal rather than state law."' 4'
The Lewis court found preemption by distinguishing Cipollone from
Medtronic. FIFRA resembles the statue at issue in Cipollone, not
Medtronic. The court stated that Cipollone and Medtronic reached
different results because the legislative intent reflected in the legislation
at issue in Cipollone was different from the kind present in
Medtronic."'2 Therefore, courts should still apply the Cipollone
analysis to FIFRA cases because the legislative intent is the same. This
application of the Cipollone analysis will effectively result in the
conclusion that FIFRA preempts state common law actions.
First, the Lewis court points out that the analysis of the MDA's
language does not apply to FIFRA because the MDA is much more
vague.' The MDA never says what state requirements it preempts,'"
while FIFRA specifically preempts labeling and packaging
requirements different from or in addition to the federal requirements."'
Therefore, Congress clearly had intended FIFRA to preempt failure to
warn claims because they are included in labeling and packaging.'
More importantly, FIFRA's preemptive provision was labeled
"Uniformity."' 47 This further shows Congress' intent for preemption.
In addition, the Lewis court points out that the proposition that
the word "requirement" does not include state common law tort actions
was not supported by a numerical majority of the Medtronic Court, who






]-See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
1457 US.C. § 136v (1988).
"6Lewis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 682 A.2d 724, 732 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996).
1477 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
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in fact concluded the opposite. 4" The dissenters in Medironic best
understood the analysis of the word "requirement." Common law
failure to warn claims do, in fact, fall into the category of "state
requirements different from or in addition to" federal regulation.'4" As
will be discussed below, failure to warn tort and contract principles put
conditions on manufacturers to follow, so they will be free of liability,
resulting in "requirements" by the states. 5 Therefore, the MDA
language specifically preempts these claims. If the term
"requirements" can never include these actions, the congressional intent
for FIFRA preemption would not be effectuated. To be consistent with
Congress' intent, it must be that the term "requirements" used in FIFRA
includes state common law failure to warn actions.
Furthermore, even though the Supreme Court focused on
congressional intent in both decisions,' the Lewis court recognized that
the analysis of "intent" by the plurality in Medtronic did not apply to
FIFRA' 52 In Medtronic, the Court concluded that Congress could not
have intended the exceptions to the extensive MDA review process to
swallow the rule, allowing no protection to injured plaintiffs.5 3 While
this presents a feasible argument against preemption by the MDA,
FIFRA does not contain these same concerns about exceptions. In fact,
FIFRA puts pesticides and their labels through an extensive EPA
review, while regulating the substance of the labels. ' In addition, the
mandated EPA review has no provisions to allow "substantially
equivalent" products to have a lesser, abbreviated review like the MDA
does. '
Finally, the Lewis court showed how plaintiffs would not be
denied protection and redress of injuries under FIFRA, as the Supreme
Court feared in analyzing the MDA.'5" As discussed below later,
plaintiffs will be able to seek relief on many other grounds, such as a
design defect claim and a duty to warn apart from the label. FIFRA
preemption is confined to common law failure to warn claims based on
inadequate labeling. These other areas of redress are not affected by
allowing federal preemption by FIFRA.
'
48Lewis, 682 A.2d at 731.
'
4 9
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 509-514.
'See infra Part V.
'Id. at 729-30 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) and
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).







Lewis, 682 A.2d at 724.
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V. THE FUTURE OF FIFRA PREEMPTION
Even in light of the Supreme Court decision in Cipollone, some
courts feel that the conclusions drawn in that case should not be applied
to a FIFRA preemption case. Courts addressing this issue still disagree
over whether section 136v(b) expressly preempts state tort law failure
to warn claims.' However, the majority of courts have found that
FIFRA does preempt such actions,' recognizing Cipollone as having
decisive implications for the FIFRA preemption controversy.'59
These courts have the task of applying the Supreme Court's
analysis in Cipollone to FIFRA preemption. They feel there is no
longer a question of whether the analysis should be applied; the only
question left is how it should be applied.'" The analysis of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act' applies to FIFRA preemption,
evidenced by the Supreme Court's decision to vacate Papas and
Arkansas-Platte, two FIFRA cases remanded in light of its Cipollone
decision. 62 The fact that the statute involved in Cipollone requires a
specific label,'63  while FIFRA only requires approval of a
manufacturer's label,IM no longer distinguishes the application of
cigarette labeling cases from those under FIFRA.'s
Within four months of the Cipollone decision, the courts in
'Compare Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that only those state tort claims that have a cause of action based on "an alleged failure to warn or
communicate information about a product through its labeling" are preempted) and Arkansas-
Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993) (reaffirming
its decision in Arkansas-Platte I in finding preemption, this time relying on an express preemption
analysis) with Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F.Supp. 1298 (D. Mont. 1992) (finding no
preemption).
'William T. Smith, IlI & Kathryn M. Coonrod, Cipollone's Effect on FIFRA
Preemption, 61 UMKC L. REV. 489,502 (1991). See also Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc.,
59 F.3d 69 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding no meaningful distinction between the 1969 Act in Cipollone
and FIFRA); Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, (9th Cir. 1995) (holding the preemptive
reach of Section 136v(b) extends to common law damage actions); MacDonald v. Monsanto Co.,
27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding FIFRA preempts state law in the area of labeling); King v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding preemption of state




See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term; Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 347,352-
57 (1992).
"See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc- 825 F.2d 620, 628 n. 13 (1 st Cir. 1987).
16115 U.S.C. §§ 133140 (1969).
62
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S.Ct. 314 (1992); Papas v.
Zoecon Corp., 112 S.Ct. 3020 (1992).
'
63
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40,
1333(a) (1969).
1147 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, 136a(c)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)_
'
6
'See Kerman v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799,805-06 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Palmer
v- Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 623 n.5, 628 n.13 (1st Cir. 1987).
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Burke v. Dow Chemical Co. 166 and Couture v. Dow Chemical U.S.A. 167
ruled against FIFRA preemption. However, it is important to note that
these courts relied on the Cipollone analysis in addressing the
preemptive scope of section 136v(b).'68 Therefore, even though they
decided against FIFRA preemption, the courts reveal that Cipollone
analysis should still be used in addressing FIFRA preemption,
regardless of the ultimate outcome on the preemption issue.
In Burke, the court found that the language of section 136v
"lies somewhere in between the 1965 and 1969 cigarette laws" so no
basis existed to justify the broad preemptive effect the Supreme Court
conceded the 1969 Act had in Cipollone.'69 The Court in Cipollone
found for preemption in the 1969 Act's statutory language because it
used broader terms than the 1965 Act. 70 Because FIFRA does not
contain the same broad language of the 1969 Act, the Burke court could
not fully equate the two statutes and found no FIFRA preemption. 7'
In Couture, the court used the "narrow construction" approach
of Cipollone to find that sections 136v(a) and 136v(b) were "expressly
designed to preclude states' rule making bodies from mandating
labeling and packaging requirements different from those imposed by
the EPA pursuant to FIFRA."' 2 The Couture court said that state tort
law damages were actually state attempts to regulate the "sale or use"
of pesticides. " 3 Therefore they are not "requirements" under section
136v(b), but instead are issues properly left to the states under section
136v(a) 74
However, most courts do not follow the reasoning of Burke and
Couture in ruling against preemption, instead applying a different
treatment to the issue of FIFRA preemption.' When applying
Cipollone analysis to FIFRA cases, it appears that FIFRA does
expressly preempt state tort law damage claims based on a failure to
'797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140-1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
6804 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D.Mont. 1992).
"'See generally Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1128; Couture, 804 F. Supp 1298.
"'Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1140.
'Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
1
71Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1140.







See, e.g., Cattell v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 1995 WL 250400 (D.N.J. 1995)
(rejecting the reasoning in Burke that FIFRA is limited to labeliig and not to warningsapart from
labeling or packaging); King v. E.I. DuPont Numerous & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 N.4
(D.Me. 1992); DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 n.2 (W.D. Ark. 1993);
Reutzal v. Spartan Chem. Co., 903 F.Supp. 1272, 1281 (N.D. Iowa 1995)(stating "...failure to
warn claims are preempted by FIFRA..."); Wright v. Dow Chem- U.S.A., 845 F. Supp. 503, 508
(M.D. Tenn. 1993) (concluding that under Cipollone FIFRA explicitly forbids certain state
regulation).
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warn. 1 6 Most pre-Cipollone cases involving FIFRA mistakenly passed
over the question of express preemption, relying instead on implied
preemption analysis.'77
For example, the Ferebee court stated that "Congress has not
explicitly preempted state damage actions; it has merely precluded
states from directly ordering changes in the EPA-approved labels.' 78
This rationale supported an implied, instead of an express, preemption
analysis. In addition, the Arkansas-Platte court used the "intent to
occupy a field" test of implied preemption to conclude that Congress
had occupied the field of pesticide labeling and packaging.'79 Yet,
because FIFRA contains an express preemptive provision regarding
state authority, 8 ' courts arc bound to consider only the express
language of FIFRA to determine the preemptive scope.'' They can no
longer use implied preemption analysis after the holding in Cipollone. '
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it focused
solely on the statutory language, not on the purpose according to
legislative history.'83 In the case of Worm v. American Cyanamid Co.,"
8 4
the court stated that when a statute expressly addresses preemption (like
FIFRA), the Cipollone test requires the court to determine whether the
relevant statutory provisions reliably indicate Congressional intent with
regard to preempting state authority and to interpret the express
language. S5
Applying the first prong of the test announced in Worm to
FIFRA, the court said that Congress specified areas where states have
authority to act, which included areas of "sale or use" and "registration
for additional uses" of federally registered pesticides."6 The Worm
court stated that Congress also set out the areas where states cannot act,
which included labeling and packaging.'87 If there was no difference in
the authority granted to states between sections (a) and (b), then section
76See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Reutzal v. Spartan Chem
Co., 903 F. Supp. 1272, 1281 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Wright v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 845 F. Supp. 503,
508 (M.D.Tenn. 1993).
"'See Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158,161
(10th Cir. 1991); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (11 th Cir. 1991); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co.. 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
"'7 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542.
179Arkansas-Plate & GulfP'ship, 959 F.2d at 160.
807 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
''See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517-18 (1992); Burke v. Dow
Chem. Co., 797 F.Supp. 1128,1136 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp.
799, 804-05 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
'82Wisconsin Pub. intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605-06 (1991).
' 3Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517-18.
"'5 F.3d 744 (41h Cir. 1993).
11IM. at 747.
5'67 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
"77 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
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(b) would be mere surplusage.' Some courts have also asserted that
because both section 1334(b) of the 1969 Cigarette Labeling Act and
section 136v(b) of FIFRA contain similar preemptive language, they
have the same effect; thus a common law action that would not survive
the 1969 Act could not survive under FIFRA either." 9 Logically, it
seems the inclusion of the express preemptive provision in FIFRA
indicates Congressional intent to preempt the area in question,
specifically pesticide labeling. 9 °
A. Opposition to FIFRA Preemption
Opponents of FIFRA preemption argue that Cipollone is
distinguishable from FIFRA preemption cases. 9' They base their
arguments on statutory construction differences in the 1969 Act and
FIFRA, as well as overall policy considerations.
1. Statutory Construction Arguments
In arguing against FIFRA preemption, opponents distinguish
the actual preemptive language of the 1969 Act from FIFRA."'9 The
Cipollone plurality based its holdings in part on changes in language
between the 1965 and 1969 Acts.'93 They stated that Congressional
intent to expand the preemptive scope of section 1334(b) was
demonstrated by broadening the language from "statement" in 1965 to
"requirements or prohibitions" in 1969. '
FIFRA, on the other hand, contains a savings provision
granting states authority to regulate the "sale or use" of pesticides.
t95
Because FIFRA expressly grants states at least some authority, courts
must be more careful in determining how far the reach of preemption
extends. Reading sections (a) and (b) of 136v, opponents argue that
Congress did not intend to preempt state common law tort actions;
under such a conclusion, FIFRA would allow states to ban a pesticide,
but not allow them to compensate injured plaintiffs for insufficient
warnings. " It is difficult to see why Congress would give states the
"'Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613.
"'Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, 981 F.2d 1177, 1179(10th
Cir. 1993).
,'See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517-18.
'Sandi L. Pellikaan, FIFRA Preemption of Common-Law Tort Claims after




'95Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 520.
194'd.
'957 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
'Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also
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right to ban a pesticide and then tell them they cannot protect injured
consumers.
2. Policy Arguments
Both the 1969 Act and FIFRA clearly have a goal to create
uniformity within their respective scope of regulation. However,
opponents say because the 1969 Act is stricter than FIFRA, there is a
marked difference in the approach each takes to achieve this
uniformity. 9 ' Under the 1969 Act, Congress mandated the exact
wording of every cigarette package, 98 thus requiring the same warning
for two different packages and even two different brands. FIFRA's
requirements are less stringent, allowing the exact same pesticide
produced by different manufacturers to have differently worded
labels.'" Opponents contend that because Congress did not intend
complete uniformity under FIFRA to the same extent as the 1969 Act,
granting state tort damages would not destroy any goal of uniform
pesticide regulation in the same way it would in the completely uniform
field of cigarette labeling."° Opponents argue that allowing common
law actions will not result in non-uniformity because no single type of
warning is required under FIFRA.'o
The amendment process for a pesticide label also gives
opponents reason to distinguish the standard of uniformity between
Cipollone and FIFRA.2° ' A pesticide manufacturer is free to change a
label at any time as long as the new language does not specifically
violate FIFRA,2 03 enabling the manufacturer to amend the label to avoid
future liability if initially held liable under a state cause of action. As
stated before, this is not the case with cigarette labels, which must have
identical warning language on every package, without any room for
modification." This argument suggests that while uniform labeling is
a goal of the 1969 Act for cigarette labels, it is not a goal of FIFRA.
In addition, opponents point to the general principle that
compliance with regulations is not a defense to liability in a common
Pellikaan, supra note 189, at 541-42.
'9'Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542; see also Pellikaan, supra, note 189, at 541-42
19115 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1995).
'1See 15 U.S.C. §§1331-40 (1969); 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y (1988).
2 0Stephen D. Otero, Note, The Case Against FIFRA Preemption: Reconciling
Cipollone's Preemption Approach with Both the Supremacy Clause and Basic Notions of
Federalism, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783, 832 (1995).
01ld
2027 U.S.C. § 136a(0(1) (1994).2031d.
2 See supra note 197, and accompanying text.
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law damage action." 5 In fact, a number of grounds justify the
maintenance of two remedial systems (regulatory and common law)
that require the manufacturer to conform to the most stringent
applicable standard.2  First, there may be a time lapse between
discovering risks of pesticide usage and creating remedial regulations
for relief of these harms." 7 In this situation, the possibility of common
law damage actions creates incentive for manufacturers to control risks
from the beginning until regulations are enacted."
t Common law
damage actions also help correct inadequacies in regulatory oversight
and enforcement that may occur when agencies lack necessary
resources to perform their responsibilities."
°  Another important
justification is that common law damage actions provide compensation
to the injured plaintiff whereas regulation generally does not.
2"'
B. Justification of FIFRA Preemption
Proponents of FIFRA preemption rely on the same bases for
their position as their opponents-statutory construction and policy.
However, the policy arguments for preemption are much stronger than
both the statutory arguments in favor of preemption, as well as both the
statutory and policy arguments against preemption.
1. Statutory Construction Arguments
To begin, the fact that the 1969 Cigarette Labeling Act
involved in Cipollone and FIFRA are not exactly alike is undisputed.
However, one the one similarity that is obvious is that both statutes
prohibit additional "requirements" from being imposed by the states.
2 '
Although opponents of FIFRA preemption have concluded that the
reach of FIFRA must be less that the reach of the 1969 Act, the focus
should not be on comparing the statutes. Because the preemption
clause in FIFRA requires a focus on the express intent of Congress,
2
the provision itself and the policy behind it must be examined to




ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 83-84 (Reporters Study 1991).
'O'1d. at 84-85.
2 71d. at 85.
2 ' Id. at 86.
2101d.
"'Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969), with 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
212Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,517 (1992).
[VOL. 16:1
2001-02] DANCING AROUND THE ISSUE OF FIFRA PREEMPTION 147
2. Policy Arguments
The underlying premise of a failure to warn claim encompasses
the idea that additional warnings should have been given.3 Under
common law tort principles, a manufacturer has a duty to warn
consumers of a product's inherent dangers, exercising reasonable care
to warn users of foreseeable dangers when the user is unlikely to be
aware of them." 4 Manufacturers who fail to warn of these dangers
market their product in an "unreasonably dangerous condition,"
subjecting themselves to strict liability."5
Under closely related contract principles, the manufacturer
must issue a specific disclaimer" 6 to escape the assumption of implied
warranty of merchantability and fitness for the product's intended
use."1 7 Many courts hold that a manufacturer breaches this warranty if
it does not warn consumers of foreseeable hazards.2"8 In addition,
manufacturers are bound by their specific warranties, such as labels,
creating liability for harm resulting from inaccurate representations." 9
Considering this, any common law damages action would
conflict with FIFRA's preemption clause because it would result in
"requirements" by a "state," which are preempted by section 136v(b) of
FIFRA.22 FIFRA undoubtedly preempts any requirements different
from or in addition to its requirements,22' and common law failure to
warn actions clearly fall under this category. Damage awards are
equivalent to statutory commands by states because of tort liability's
coercive effect and therefore should be treated as any other form of
state regulation.22 The threat of damage awards puts conditions on
manufacturers by essentially telling the manufacturer that if it does not
comply, the result will be strict liability in tort or breach of warranty in
contract.
Furthermore, Congress' goal was to create a single,
comprehensive regulatory scheme, evidenced by the use of the heading
213
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (I 965).21
41d.
2 .see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
216See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978).
"'TSee U.C.C. §§ 2-314,2-315, 2-316 (1978).
2'
18See Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1391-92 (Kan. 1976); Gardner v.
Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1971).
219See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978).
"07 U.S.C. §136v(b) (1988). However, the Supreme Court has decided contractual
commitments should not be regarded as a requirement. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 506 (1992) (holding that cigarette manufacturers are still liable for breach of "express'"
warranty because they voluntarily assumed responsibility).
2217 U.S.C. §136v(b) (1988).
22
2Ausness, supra note 65, at 270- (citing Worm v. American Cyanamid, 970 F.2d
1301, 1307 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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"Uniformity" for the preemptive section of FIFRA.
223 This title would
certainly conflict with a goal promoting various, differentiating state
enactments in addition to federal law. As previously discussed,
Supreme Court dicta in Mortier supports the proposition that FIFRA
preemption exists in the areas of labeling and packaging.
24
Necessity dictated the congressional intent to preempt state
common law tort actions when Congress enacted a comprehensive
regulatory program to make this area uniform.
225 Congress and the EPA
have created a formal process where labels of pesticides have to survive
great scrutiny for approval.226 Congress must have intended that the
EPA would be the only one to assess the warnings on such pesticides.
2"
Otherwise, as previously discussed, the idea of uniformity and the
separate section 136v(b) in FIFRA would be surplusage.
2"' FIFRA
litigation would result in different decisions depending on state
boundaries. This would create the very same non-uniformity that
Congress tried to eliminate in enacting FIFRA.
Although FIFRA requires no specific uniform warning,
pesticide manufacturers still have very little leeway because of the
stringent guidelines they must follow.229 As discussed above, labels
must meet numerous, specific requirements approval.
3 lecause
pesticides vary, their labels' exact warning must be unique to them.
Yet, because of the guidelines they must follow, the labels' substance is
the same.
Essentially, because the regulations make pesticide labels as
uniform as possible given each pesticide's individual characteristics,
FIFRA closely resembles the regulations in Cipollone in the important
aspects.231 The only difference is that slight concessions must be made
for pesticides because as products they are not as uniform as cigarettes.
Therefore, it should be expected that the less-uniform nature of these
products dictate a law that is slightly less uniform than, but still
substantively similar to, the regulations in Cipollone.
In addition, opponents sometimes fail to realize exactly what
they are arguing against. FIFRA does not seek to preempt all causes of
2237 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
224Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 613-14 (1991).22 5
Papas, 926 F.2d at 1025.
"
6
See40 C.F.R. § 156.10 (1998).
"
22Timothy J. Kuester, Comment, FIFRA as an Affirmative Defense. Pre-emption of
Common-Law Tort Claims of Inadequate Labeling, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 1119, 1140 (1992)_22
Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613.
229
40 C.F.R. §156.10 (1998).
230See id.
231
See Cipollone v- Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 -1 3 6y
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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action.232 Such a proposition has never been advanced. The only area
FIFRA effectively preempts is common law failure to warn actions
based on inadequate labeling.233 Plaintiffs may continue to freely
pursue many other causes of action, such as the duty to warn apart from
the label2 and design defect,238 without any interference by the doctrine
of federal preemption.
On the other hand, numerous considerations weigh against the
justifications for the proposition of a dual remedial system, discussed
above. First, dual remedial systems are expensive to maintain because
they require two different sectors to make determinations regarding the
same product and its hazards. 36 It is definitely much more efficient for
one system alone to do this work.
When causation proves difficult to determine, regulatory
agencies can assess risk and create remedies better than common law
schemes because of their specialized knowledge.237 If left to common
law actions, inconsistent jury verdicts may cause manufacturer's duties
to vary depending on what state the product is sold.3 8 As discussed
thoroughly before, Congress intended to prevent this non-uniformity by
enacting FIFRA.
Another problem with dual remedial systems is over-
deterrence. 9 For example, if a regulation is lenient, courts can still
sanction manufacturers who produce unsafe products even when
manufacturers complied with the regulation.24 On the other hand, a
court cannot excuse a manufacturer who fails to comply with an overly
stringent regulation.241 Therefore, in a dual remedial system the stricter
regulations will eventually win out, because manufacturers will follow
them to safely hedge against liability.42 This could possibly increase
all regulations to an unreasonably high level with which manufacturers
will have to comply to avoid liability.242 Over-deterrence can actually
decrease safety because consumers will choose to ignore the excessive
2 32







See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (E.DN.Y. 1992).
21'See Kevin McElroy et al., The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act:
Preemption and Toxic Tort Law, 2 FORDHAm ENVTL. L. REP 29, 39-42 (1990).236
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and confusing warnings rather than try to sort through them."
4
As shown, the justifications for FIFRA preemption exceed in
number and in quality the opponents' arguments against preemption.
FIFRA's similarity to the preemption provision in Cipollone, along
with congressional intent and the serious ramifications of having dual
remedial systems, shows that there is clear preemption in the area of
common law failure to warn causes of action by FIFRA.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the Cipollone decision, it appeared that courts had finally
come to an understanding that FIFRA did preempt common law failure
to warn claims. Opponents of FIFRA preemption advanced persuasive
arguments as to how regulations at issue in Cipollone are
distinguishable from FIFRA, making the Cipollone analysis
inapplicable. However, the proponents of FIFRA preemption had even
stronger arguments. In focusing on congressional intent, FIFRA's
language alone is enough to show its intended preemptive effect, even
without comparing it with Cipollone. Some opponents will still insist
that the more recent decision against preemption by the Supreme Court
in Medtronic will impact the trend of allowing federal preemption of
FIFRA. However, the language and congressional intent in Medtronic
are very different from FIFRA, making it difficult to apply the same
analysis to pesticide litigation. If forced to compare, the FIFRA statute
clearly resembles the statute involved in Cipollone more than it
resembles Medtronic. Until the Supreme Court decides the preemption
issue specifically for pesticides, courts should apply a Cipollone
analysis to FIFRA preemption cases rather than a Medtronic analysis.
By doing this, it will be obvious that FIFRA intended to preempt all
common law failure to warn claims.
2"See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Worn: Disentangling the "Right to Know "from
the "Need to Know" About Product Hazards, I I YALE J. ON REG. 293, 374-77, 381 (1994).
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